In this Jan. 6, 2021, file photo, supporters of then-President Donald Trump amass outside the Capitol building in Washington, D.C.: NAJ Screen Shot
By Glynn Wilson –
WASHINGTON, D.C. — A Senate committee released a scathing report on Tuesday with details of how the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies repeatedly ignored, downplayed or failed to share warnings of violence before the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol in 2021.
The report from the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee concludes that law enforcement received numerous tips about significant online posts threatening violence at the Capitol, yet failed to accurately assess this intelligence and share the information with law enforcement partners.
“Despite the high volume of tips and online traffic about the potential for violence – some of which the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis were aware of as early as December 2020 — these agencies failed to sound the alarm and share critical intelligence information that could have helped law enforcement better prepare for the events of Jan. 6, 2021,” said Senator Gary Peters of Michigan, chairman of the committee.
The 106-page report, entitled “Planned in Plain Sight,” shows there was “a shocking failure of imagination from these intelligence agencies to take these threats seriously, and there is no question that their failures to effectively analyze and share the threat information contributed to the failures to prevent and respond to the horrific attack that unfolded at the Capitol,” Peters said.
Senate staff obtained thousands of documents from federal law enforcement agencies, including the Justice Department, before drafting the report, which shows there were multiple calls for armed violence, to occupy federal buildings including the Capitol, and some of the clearest threats the FBI received but did little about, including a warning that the far-right militia group the Proud Boys was planning to kill people in Washington.
“Our intelligence agencies completely dropped the ball,” Peters said. “Despite a multitude of tips and other intelligence warnings of violence on Jan. 6, the report showed that these agencies repeatedly — repeatedly — downplayed the threat level and failed to share the intelligence they had with law enforcement partners.”
The report determined the FBI’s monitoring of social media threats was “degraded mere days before the attack,” because the bureau changed contracts for third-party social media monitoring. The committee obtained internal emails showing that FBI officials were “surprised” by the timing of the contract change and “lamented the negative effect it would have on their monitoring capabilities in the lead-up to Jan. 6.”
Yet the report includes interviews with two FBI leaders who said they were unaware that Congress could come under siege.
“If everybody knew and all the public knew that they were going to storm Congress, I don’t know why one person didn’t tell us,” Jennifer Moore, the special agent in charge of the FBI Washington Field Office’s intelligence division, told the Senate investigators.
Jill Sanborn, the former assistant director of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, testified: “None of us had any intelligence that suggested individuals were going to storm and breach the Capitol.”
Did they not pay attention to social media themselves? Why did someone have to tell them? Could any of this have to do with the fact that some of these agents were on the job due to loyalty to President Donald Trump, the commander-in-chief at the time? The report doesn’t address that possibility or the blatant help some of the Trump supporters who participated in the attack received from law enforcement, including the Capitol Police and high officials with the D.C. Metro Police Department.
Related: DC Top Cop Indicted for Obstruction in Colluding With Proud Boys Leader
The performance of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis was criticized. The committee found that the agency, on Jan. 2, discovered that individuals were sharing a map of the Capitol online. One employee messaged another, saying, “feel like people are actually going to try and hurt politicians.”
Yet agency analysts appeared not to take such threats seriously, even as it became clear that the violence being warned about was materializing. At 2:58 p.m. on Jan. 6, after the police had declared a riot and the Capitol had been locked down, analysts internally noted online chatter that “called for more violent actions,” but added that “at this time no credible information to pass on has been established.”
A representative for the FBI said that it had been working with law enforcement agencies, including the Capitol Police, in the lead-up to and on the day of Jan. 6: “We also set up command posts and had tactical assets ready to deploy should our partners request such assistance.”
The House committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol also detailed a “colossal intelligence failure,” uncovering tips like a Dec. 26 warning that the Proud Boys were amassing “a large enough group to march into D.C. armed and will outnumber the police so they can’t be stopped.”
That committee, which undertook one of the largest investigative efforts in congressional history, drew some criticism from some of its own staff for focusing intensely on former President Donald Trump’s role in the plan to overturn the 2020 election, and not placing as much emphasis on law enforcement’s intelligence failures.
Peters said the committee’s report was meant “to fill in some gaps.”
Key Findings
The report’s key findings include one showing that the FBI and I&A received numerous early warnings, tips, and other intelligence about plans for violence on Jan. 6, yet produced only two limited raw intelligence documents related to Jan. 6, both issued the night before the attack, and I&A did not issue any intelligence products specific to Jan. 6.
Despite claims by some agency officials and analysts, FBI and I&A had the authority to monitor open-source intelligence, including social media, and agency guidelines required them to report certain online threats — yet they failed to follow agency guidelines on the use of open-source intelligence.
While public reporting and previous congressional investigations have shown that the FBI and I&A had intelligence about plans for violence on Jan. 6, Peters’ report provides new information about the sheer volume of warnings these agencies received that indicated the potential for violence. The investigation also shows that despite having this information, agencies repeatedly downplayed the threat level and failed to effectively share the intelligence with law enforcement partners.
The report also shows that FBI and I&A struggled to use open source intelligence — with appropriate restrictions to protect Constitutional rights — such as social media posts to monitor and assess threats to lawmakers and the Capitol. For example, the Committee obtained internal emails from I&A where — even after rioters breached the Capitol — analysts had difficulty deciding whether online posts calling for violence at the Capitol indicated that there was a reportable threat.
Finally, the investigation found that multiple federal agencies failed to coordinate to ensure frontline security personnel were prepared to defend the Capitol.
As Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Peters has long pressed the federal government to do more to combat domestic terrorism, including white supremacist and anti-government violence. During the last Congress, he released an investigative report that found while independent experts and national security officials call white supremacist and anti-government extremist violence the most significant terrorist threat facing our nation today, counterterrorism agencies like the FBI and DHS were still not taking adequate steps to effectively address this growing threat.
